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FITNESS OR AGE AS AN OCCUPATIONAL
QUALIFICATION FOR PROTECTIVE
SERVICE WORKERS: A CHOICE
BETWEEN BONA FIDE CRITERION
OR ARBITRARY DISCRIMINATION?
I. INTRODUCTION
The assertion of an employer's right to discriminate on the
basis of age is made frequently in the protective service occu-
pations of police officers and firefighters. This occurs despite
the prohibition of age discrimination set forth in the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA or the Act).' The
purposes of the ADEA are threefold: "to promote employ-
ment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help
employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising
from the impact of age upon employment." 2  Protective ser-
vice employers are entitled to protection from age
discrimination.
Although the Act serves to protect older employees, it
does not require an employer to hire or retain an individual
who is not qualified. It does require that in order to terminate
an individual an employer have proof, other than age, that an
individual is not qualified. The Act acknowledges that all or
most persons over a certain age may be unable to meet the
demands of a particular job. It is for this reason a bona fide
occupational qualification exception (BFOQ) is included in
the ADEA.3
Police officers and firefighters must be qualified and com-
petent to do their jobs, just as employees in other professions
must be duly competent. However, because police officers and
firefighters are involved with public safety, job fitness is a par-
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Generally, the ADEA prohibits
discrimination in employment against individuals who are at least 40 years of age but
less than 70 years. As originally passed in 1967, the Act did not apply to federal, state
or municipal employers. in 1974, Congress extended the Act to these employers by
amendment of § 1 l(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b)(1982).
3. 29 C.F.R. § 860.102 (1980) (citing examples of BFOQ exemptions including age
requirements for pilots and actors).
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amount concern; age, therefore, is liberally asserted as a
BFOQ in these professions.
In a recent age discrimination case, the Supreme Court in
Western Airlines v. Criswell4 accepted the BFOQ as an ex-
tremely narrow exception to the prohibition of age discrimina-
tion contained in the ADEA. The Court acknowledged safety
as a legitimate consideration. However, it also noted that
safety considerations "are only relevant at the margin of a
close case, and do not relieve the employer from its burden of
establishing the BFOQ by the preponderance of credible evi-
dence."5 "Safety" is not a BFOQ. However, "safety" is the
reason articulated for police and firefighter mandatory retire-
ment standards as low as age fifty.6 There are also require-
ments that no one over age twenty-nine may be hired.' These
standards have imposed a discriminatory criterion based
solely upon age. Those older than a designated retirement or
hiring age are assumed to be unfit for the job. Therefore, age
as a BFOQ is asserted as necessary to assure competent pro-
tection of the public.
There is no proof that the public would be jeopardized if
this arbitrary age discrimination were not imposed. Fitness
for the job, rather than age, is the logical employment crite-
rion and focus of the BFOQ analysis. If age is to be a reason
for discharge or refusal to hire, it should be supported by em-
pirical data which validates a BFOQ. This data can be pro-
vided only by assessment of the police officer's and firefighter's
job-related abilities as interfaced with an objective age factor.
Although the public deserves to be protected by a capable pro-
tective service force, youth is no guarantee of public safety.
Section 4(f) of the ADEA sets forth the affirmative de-
fenses of a bona fide occupational qualification: "It shall not
be unlawful for an employer, employment agency or labor or-
4. 105 S. Ct. 2743 (1985).
5. Id. at 2754 n.29. The Court went on to state that "[w]hen an employer estab-
lishes that a job qualification has been carefully formulated to respond to documented
concerns for public safety, it will not be overly burdensome to persuade a trier of fact
that the qualification is 'reasonably necessary' to the safe operation of the business." Id.
at 2754.
6. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1984).
7. See, e.g., Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 770 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Missouri
State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1984).
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ganization (1) to take any action otherwise prohibited . . .
where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business
"'8
Thus, the BFOQ defense entails an admission that age is a
determining factor in an employment decision, but that the
use of age can be justified. The finding of a BFOQ permits the
age-based discrimination that the ADEA is designed to pre-
vent. The BFOQ is to be construed narrowly; to do otherwise
undermines the intent of the ADEA.
Although the process of aging impacts equally on each
federal district, the various districts continue to hold differing
views on how the universal aging process affects the protective
service worker. 9 Depending on the district, the "narrow"
BFOQ exception may encompass an entire police force or an
individual worker.
This Comment considers the BFOQ exception to the pro-
hibition of age discrimination as it is applied to the protective
service employee. The focal point of the BFOQ exception in-
quiry is "the particular business." Courts differ over whether
that term should be broadly or narrowly defined. In other
words, the threshold question is whether it is the desk ser-
geant's job or the police officer's job that constitutes a "partic-
ular business?" This Comment concludes that the legislative
intent of the ADEA, as well as United States Supreme Court's
8. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The remaining affirmative defenses
are: "to take any action otherwise prohibited ... where the differentiation is based on
reasonable factors other than age. . . to observe the terms of. . . a bona fide seniority
system . . . or any bona fide employee benefit plan . . . or to discharge or otherwise
discipline an individual for good cause." Id.
The defenses of "reasonable factors other than age" and "good cause" are used by
the defendant to support the proposition that there is no causal connection between the
employment action and age. The remaining defenses - BFOQ, the seniority system,
and benefit plan defenses - are true affirmative defenses. The employer acknowledges
that age was the reason for the challenged decision but asserts that the decision is justi-
fied. Marshall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1978) (establishing
the distinction between the defenses).
9. Compare Popkins v. Zagel, 611 F. Supp 809 (C.D. Ill. 1985) (court found that
state statute requiring police officers to retire at age 60 satisfied the equal protection
clause by assuring physical preparedness of police) with EEOC v. City of Bowling
Green, 607 F. Supp. 524 (W.D. Ky. 1985) (court held that the EEOC was entitled to a
preliminary injunction because city had failed to demonstrate that age was a BFOQ
necessary for the normal operation of the business).
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interpretation of the Act, supports the view that an individual
job is the relevant point of inquiry.
This Comment then compares the BFOQ in both a hiring
and retirement context. In a hiring context, the BFOQ is sup-
ported by neither data nor logic as an exception to the
ADEA's policy against age discrimination. On the other
hand, it is possible to empirically support a BFOQ in a retire-
ment context. Thus, reliable data based on job-related fitness
assessments of employees can support at least a rebuttable
presumption of retirement at a designated age.
Objective job-related fitness assessments are feasible and
desirable to ensure the safety of the public by ensuring the
competence of protective service employees at any age. These
objective assessments are the only way to obtain relevant data
in support of a BFOQ exception to the ADEA.
II. THE FOCAL POINT OF THE INQUIRY: THE MEANING
OF "PARTICULAR BUSINESS"
The ADEA requires that a BFOQ must be "reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business
....,,"10 As applied to protective service occupations, the
"reasonably necessary" standard has been interpreted as
meaning necessary to protect the safety of the public.II A pro-
tective service employee's tasks can require a wide range of
abilities. Police work involves confrontation with criminals as
well as assisting school children across the street; fire depart-
ment jobs include a chief as well as firefighters. Because of
these variances, the courts have issued varied opinions on
what is meant by the statutory phrase: "normal operation of a
particular business."12 Courts may focus on an assignment, a
job, or the profession as a whole.
The Seventh Circuit addressed the issue in EEOC v. City of
Janesville.I3 That case concerned an attack on the city's
mandatory retirement age of fifty-five for police officers. The
city contended that by "particular business" the Act meant
10. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
11. See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAw 58 (2d ed. Supp. 1983).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1982).
13. 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980).
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the entire police department. The EEOC contended that the
phrase "particular business" referred to the particular activi-
ties of the individual employee, or category of employees,
within the department.14
The Seventh Circuit accepted the city's argument, inter-
preting the statutory phrase "particular business" to mean the
primary function of the employer's business. This decision
was reached despite the fact that previous cases on the issue
had analyzed the BFOQ issue in terms of the duties of the
particular job.15
The City of Janesville court opined that the "plain mean-
ing" of the statutory language should be strictly construed.
The court stated that "[Congress was certainly at liberty to
limit the applicability of a BFOQ to a particular 'occupation'
rather than to a 'business' if it so intended," 16 but Congress
chose not to do so. In ascertaining the "plain meaning," the
court dismissed the legislative history of the ADEA as yield-
ing no support for a narrower "occupation" construction.17
Thus, it is ironic that the Janesville court attributed its "plain
meaning" to "particular business" because Congress left the
term ambiguous.
The Eighth Circuit identified a different "plain meaning."
In EEOC v. City of St. Paul,18 the court examined the relevant
legislative history and concluded that Congress intended that
employment decisions be based on ability rather than age.
The court asserted further that the goal of the ADEA would
be undermined if retirement and hiring age requirements were
imposed on a generic class rather than on various occupations
within a "particular business."19 As the Eighth Circuit con-
cluded: "We cannot believe that the ADEA was intended to
14. Id. at 1258-59.
15. See Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977); Houghton v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines, 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975);
Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
16. Janesville, 630 F.2d at 1258.
17. Id.
18. 671 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1982).
19. Id. at 1165-66.
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allow a city to retire a police dispatcher because that person is
too old to serve on a SWAT team."2
The plain meaning of "particular business" was subject to
yet another interpretation by the First Circuit. That court
chose to take an approach somewhere in between treating em-
ployees as a generic class and treating each job individually.
In Mahoney v. Trabucco,21 the court decided that a Massachu-
setts law requiring uniformed state troopers to retire at age
fifty did not violate the ADEA because the retirement age was
imposed on a police sergeant assigned to an administrative po-
sition. The unanimous opinion expressed the concept that
within any particular business, specific occupations may exist
requiring separate age limitations.22 However, among the
Massachusetts police, the First Circuit did not find distinct
occupations warranting separate age requirements; instead the
court found officers with varying assignments. On this point,
the court reasoned as follows:
When, however, a person signs up in a paramilitary uni-
formed force, where one is subject to generally unrestricted
reassignment and performance of the most strenuous duties
in any emergency, and undergoes the military training re-
quired of all recruits, with the expectation of receiving spe-
cial pension and disability benefits, we would be loath to
equate particular "assignments," even if of long duration,
to "occupations. 23
In 1985 the United States Supreme Court considered the
issue and held that the term "particular business" in the Act's
BFOQ provision is "the job from which the protected individ-
ual is excluded."' 24 This holding, however, did not clarify the
issue; it merely shifted the semantic debate from "particular
20. Id. at 1166.
The Eighth Circuit appeared to alter its position on the "particular business" issue
in EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1984). Although
not addressing the specific interpretation of the "particular business" language, the
court supported a mandatory retirement age of 60 for all state highway patrol members,
a maximum hiring age of 32 for all patrol members and a maximum hiring age of 32 for
radio operators. Id. at 448. The dissenting opinion regarding the maximum hiring age
for radio operators, referred to the earlier St. Paul decision in noting the job differences
between regular highway patrol members and radio operators. Id. at 457-58.
21. 738 F.2d 35 (Ist Cir. 1984).
22. Id. at 39.
23. Id.
24. Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 105 S. Ct. 613, 622 (1985).
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business" to "job" so that the confusion persists.25 Therefore,
even despite "direction" from the Supreme Court, courts con-
tinue to leave the focal point of the BFOQ analysis in doubt.
Is the analysis applied to an assignment, a job, or an
occupation?
A generic business focal point, as opposed to an individual
assignment focus is desired by some employers. 26 These em-
ployers argue that if assignments or jobs were treated individ-
ually, employees could switch from jobs with a mandatory
retirement age to jobs without one. However, this employee
option has already been endorsed by the Supreme Court in
Trans World Airlines v. Thurston. In that case, involving the
transfer of pilots to flight engineers, the Court stated: "Noth-
ing in the legislative history [of the Act] . . indicates a con-
gressional intention to allow an employer to discriminate
against an older worker seeking to transfer to another posi-
tion, on the ground that age was a BFOQ for his former
job."28
In fact, the purpose of the ADEA is to encourage employ-
ment of older Americans.2 9 The availability of transfer facili-
tates employment. This does not mean special treatment, just
equal treatment. If a vacancy occurs older employees should
have the same option to transfer that is available to others.
The BFOQ exception exists only in the protective services for
public safety concerns. 30 Transfers or promotions to positions
25. Some recent federal decisions illustrate the confusion. Ignoring Thurston, a
federal court followed Mahoney and upheld a mandatory retirement age for a public
information officer. The rationale offered was that a police force is paramilitary in na-
ture such that all personnel must be ready for emergency action, regardless of their job
duties. EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 768 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1985). See also Popkins v. Zagel,
611 F. Supp. 809, 813 (C.D. Ill. 1985) (public information officer in fact never had to
respond in an emergency; nevertheless the court stated that "the BFOQ focus is on the
'business' and not on the assignment.").
26. See, e.g., Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 484 (1983); Smallwood v. United Airlines, 661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir.
1981). See also generally Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90
HARV. L. REV. 380, 407-410 (1976).
27. 105 S. Ct. 613 (1985).
28. Id. at 623 (emphasis omitted).
29. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
30. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6. The EEOC guidelines make clear that when age is asserted
as a BFOQ for reasons of public safety, those asserting the defense will be held to the
same high standard of proof as that which is applied whenever a BFOQ is asserted.
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not directly involved with the safety of others render this basis
for the BFOQ exception to ADEA inapplicable.
The application of BFOQ to a protective service profession
as a generic whole permits broad interpretation of the BFOQ.
This is contrary to the intent of its inclusion in the ADEA.
"[T]he BFOQ exception was in fact meant to be an extremely
narrow exception to the general prohibition of age discrimina-
tion contained in the ADEA. ' ' 31 Thus, the employer seeking
to rely on a BFOQ must demonstrate that because of the du-
ties involved in a particular job, the use of age as an indicator
of fitness for the particular job is justified.32
Language in other sections of the ADEA supports this
narrow interpretation of a BFOQ. The ADEA makes it un-
lawful for an employer "to . . .classify his employees in any
way which would deprive. . . any individual of employment
opportunities . . .because of such individual's age."' 33 For
example, classifying all police officers under one heading such
as "protective service occupation" allows for individual differ-
ences in police department jobs to be ignored. While a chief at
age fifty-five may not be able to do the work of a patrol officer,
a chief may still be a capable administrator. A generic classifi-
cation would require retirement of the chief at age fifty-five,
irrespective of administrative capabilities. The ADEA's ban
on classifications that adversely affect older workers was in-
tended to prohibit just this type of employment practice.34
Legislative history supports this conclusion. Senate find-
ings indicate as follows: "For capable older workers the re-
tirement decision should be an individual option. Maximum
freedom of choice should be given to employees in deciding
31. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 324 (1977).
32. See, e.g., Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1984); EEOC v.
County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1983); Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire
Dep't, 697 F.2d 743 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 484 (1983); Stewart v. Smith, 673
F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1982); EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1982);
EEOC v. County of Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1982); Kossman v. Calumet
County, 600 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Wis. 1985); Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 596 F. Supp. 939
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1976).
34. See Note, The Scope of the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Exemption
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 57 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1145 (1981).
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when to retire, provided they are still physically and psycho-
logically able to perform their jobs in a satisfactory manner."35
One of the ADEA purposes is to promote employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age.3 6 It
would be inconsistent with this purpose to permit a city to
retire its police chief, who was completely able to fulfill the
duties of that job, because of an inability to fulfill the duties of
another position within the department. The narrow con-
struction of the BFOQ exception is facilitated only by a job-
specific analysis.
III. DEFINING A BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL
QUALIFICATION
A. By Statute
The language of the ADEA does not provide a definition
of what constitutes a BFOQ.37 The courts have assumed the
task. In an attempt to assert age as a BFOQ for protective
service personnel, courts have looked to factors outside of the
individual case, preferring to apply statutorily-defined
BFOQ's. In this vein, courts have applied municipal, state,
and federal statutes to the ADEA. However, imposing these
requirements of municipal, state and federal statutes on the
ADEA is not always consistent with the public policy incor-
porated in the ADEA.
The United States Supreme Court has noted that although
some statutes allow mandatory retirement of federal protec-
tive service employees, this does not provide a blanket BFOQ
for all protective service workers. 38 "The mere fact that some
federal firefighters are required to cease work at age 55 does
35. S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 504, 506 (emphasis added). "The committee intends to make clear that...
an employer would not be required to retain anyone who is not qualified to perform a
particularjob." S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 504, 513 (emphasis added). See also Western Airlines v. Criswell,
105 S. Ct. 2743, 2749-51 (1985) (extensive discussion of legislative history).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b)(1976).
37. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
38. See Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 105 S. Ct. 2717 (1985).
[Vol. 69:422
PROTECTIVE SER VICE EMPLOYEES' BFOQ'S
not provide an absolute defense to an ADEA action challeng-
ing state and local age limits for firefighters. 39
The Court did, however, allude to situations where a fed-
eral requirement may be a defense for a mandatory age limita-
tion. If such a federal requirement is based on a BFOQ under
the Act, it may be extended in application to permit state and
local age requirements.40 Thus the federal laws, as well as
state and local government laws, which limit employment op-
39. Id. at 2722. Commenting on the federal statute mandating retirement at age 55
for federal firefighters, the Supreme Court stated:
The history of the civil service provision, however, makes clear that the decision
to retire certain federal employees at an early age was not based on bona fide
occupational qualifications for the covered employment. The history demon-
strates instead that Congress has acted to deal with the idiosyncratic problems of
federal employees in the federal civil service. Id. at 2723.
And noting that the retirement age for the F.B.I. was based on less than an empiri-
cal certainty, the Court stated:
However, neither the language of the 1974 amendment nor its legislative history
offers any indication why Congress wanted to maintain the image of a "young
man's service," or why Congress thought that 55 was the proper cut-off age, or
whether Congress believed that older employees in fact could not meet the de-
mands of these occupations. Indeed, Congressmen who opposed the bill voiced
their concern for the singling out of one group of employees for preferential
treatment through enhanced annuities and early retirement, and did not even
acknowledge that the exigencies of the job might have anything to do with Con-
gress' willingness to accord special treatment to a group of employees. H.R.
Rep. No. 93-463, supra, at 20. Moreover, the allowance that firefighters who
had not yet served for 20 years could remain in their jobs, see id., at 6, along
with other exceptions to the general rule of retirement, casts serious doubt on
any argument that Congress in fact believed that either the employee or the pub-
lic would be jeopardized by the employment of older firefighters. Id. at 2724.
40. Id. at 2726-27.
FAA regulations supporting the mandatory retirement at age 60 were apparently
based on a 1959 report. See 49 Fed. Reg. 14692 (proposed April 12, 1984). Despite this,
a federal district court, deferred to the FAA expertise and granted a summary judgment
upholding a mandatory retirement age for pilots based on FAA regulations stating:
The court is convinced that, because the FAA regulation is based on considera-
tions that would support a BFOQ, the regulation may establish a BFOQ for jobs
similar to that of an airline pilot. Whether the regulation does establish a BFOQ
for such jobs depends on various factors addressed in the next section of this
Order. EEOC argues that Johnson, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 2712, precludes
adoption of a regulation as a BFOQ for jobs to which the regulation is inapplica-
ble. The court does not read Johnson this way. In the court's view, Johnson
merely precludes adoption of a regulation without examination of the reasons for
the regulation.
The court's decision thus foreclosed an analysis of the regulation based on present day
medical technology and BFOQ standards. EEOC v. Boeing Co., No. C84-187R, slip
op. at - (W.D. Wash. May 23, 1985).
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portunities based on age, must meet the standards for the es-
tablishment of a valid BFOQ. If they do not they should be
superseded by public policy as reflected in the ADEA.41
B. The Development of a BFOQ Standard
The language of the protective service BFOQ in the
ADEA is borrowed directly from Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.42 The similarity between Title VII and the Act
has been reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court.43
The Title VII analogy has formed the basis for the judicial
interpretation of the intent of the ADEA, including the
BFOQ language.
Based on Title VII cases, the Supreme Court has recently
adopted a two-element standard in Western Airlines v. Cris-
well.' This two-element test was previously adopted by the
Fifth Circuit in Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours.45 The second
Tamiami element had two parts: First, proof of the unfitness
of at least some members of the class had to be established and
second, proof of the infeasibility of individual determinations
of fitness for the job was required. The latter proof require-
ment alone was considered insufficient.46 Nevertheless, the
41. Neither the states nor the federal government should be permitted to ignore the
intent of the ADEA. As the Eighth Circuit pointed out: "[S]tate law could create a
class of 'all state employees' and thereby allow the state to retire a clerk because he or
she is too old to fight fires." EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d at 1162. See also
Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 65 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that a federal retire-
ment scheme does not preempt further inquiry into the reasonable necessity of a
mandatory retirement policy established by some other body). But see Gathercole v.
Global Assocs., 727 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1984) (defendant air transportation company
did business with the army which required retirement at age 60 per FAA regulations;
the court upheld the retirement age as a matter of law).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1)(1982). Title VII prohibits discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
43. See Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 105 S. Ct. 613 (the substantive provi-
sions of the ADEA "were derived in haec verba from Title VII." (quoting Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)).
44. 105 S. Ct. 2743 (1985).
45. 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
46. Accord EEOC v. University of Texas Health Science Center, 710 F.2d 1091
(5th Cir. 1983) (explaining the necessity of both parts of the second Tamiami element).
These courts also applied the two-part Tamiami test: EEOC v. Missouri State Highway
Patrol, 748 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1984); Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1984);
EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 484
(1983); Stewart v. Smith, 673 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1982); EEOC v. County of Santa
Barbara, 666 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1982); Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 596 F. Supp. 939
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Tamiami test, as adopted by the Supreme Court, can be stated
as follows:
Unless an employer can establish a substantial basis for be-
lieving that all or nearly all employees above an age lack the
qualifications required for the position, the age for
mandatory retirement less than 70 must be an age at which
it is highly impractical for the employer to ensure by individ-
ual testing that the employees will have the necessary qualifi-
cations for the job.47
The Court's interpretation of the Tamiami test requires
employers to establish either that employees over a certain age
are unqualified or that it is administratively impossible to
screen for individuals who are in fact unqualified. The inclu-
sion of "or" in this adaptation is curious. It is contrary to the
purposes of the Act to escape a determination of discrimina-
tion by proving the latter without also having to prove the
former. To do so would allow an arbitrary administrative ex-
ception to the Act based on a factor unrelated to the ability to
do a job. Courts that applied the Tamiami test prior to Cris-
well considered it an inclusive two part analysis.
IV. APPLYING THE CRISWELL/TAMIAMI STANDARD
A. The First Test. All or Nearly All Employees
Above a Certain Age Lack Qualifications Required
for the Position
The establishment of an age limit because all or nearly all
employees over a certain age lack necessary qualifications (the
(W.D.N.Y. 1984); EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 596 F. Supp. 1333 (D. Pa. 1984); EEOC v.
City of Minneapolis, 537 F. Supp. 750 (D. Minn. 1982).
47. Criswell, 105 S. Ct. at 2756. The two-element BFOQ standard adopted by the
Supreme Court was derived directly from two Title VII cases. The first element is from
Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S.
950 (1971). It is a requirement that the employer demonstrate that the job qualification
of an age requirement is reasonably necessary to the essence of the business. Diaz, 442
F.2d at 388. The second element is the rule articulated in Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel.
& Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). In Weeks, a sex discrimination case in which
the job required the lifting of weights, the Fifth Circuit said that an employer could rely
on the BFOQ exception in proving "that he had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a
factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all women would be unable to per-
form safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved." Id. at 235. The court pro-
vided that as an alternative to this element of the test a qualification may be justified if
the employer demonstrates "that it is impossible or highly impractical to deal with wo-
men on an individualized basis." Id. at 235, n.5.
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"business necessity" rationale) must be analyzed in terms of
the unique nature of age discrimination:
Age discrimination is not the same as the insidious discrimi-
nation based on race or creed prejudices and bigotry. Those
discriminations result in non-employment because of feelings
about a person entirely unrelated to his ability to do a job.
This is hardly a problem for the older jobseeker. Discrimi-
nation arises for him because of assumptions that are made
about the effects of age on performance. As a general rule,
ability is ageless.48
Indeed, the Senate Committee report resulting in the 1978
ADEA amendments noted that arguments for retaining ex-
isting mandatory retirement policies are primarily based on
misconceptions rather than upon a careful analysis of the
facts. The report did acknowledge that: "in certain types of
particularly arduous law enforcement activity, there may be a
factual basis for believing that substantially all employees
above a specified age would be unable to continue to perform
safely and efficiently the duties of their particular
jobs. . .1.9 Based on these consideratons, an employer of
protective service personnel should be allowed to discriminate
48. 113 CONG. REc. 34,742 (1976) (statement of Rep. Burke).
There continues to be little support for the widespread belief that job performance
declines with age. In fact, it may be just the opposite. After extensive analysis of 13
studies conducted between 1940 and 1983 by David Waldman and Bruce Avolio, two
state of New York Psychologists, strong evidence of a correlation between performance
improvements and increasing age was found. In addition, assessment of older workers
abilities varied depending on type of measurements used, with older workers facing
better when objective measures of job-related abilities were employed. Waldman &
Avolio, A-Meta Analysis of Age Differences in Job Performance, 71 J. APPLIED PSY-
CHOLOGY 33-38 (1986).
This study concluded that:
Perhaps what is needed is less consideration of or reliance on chronological age
and greater use of intrinsic predictors of job performance. In other words,
through the use of job analysis, specific mental and physical requirements can be
identified for workers in a given job. These abilities may decline for different
workers to various degrees with increasing age. The arbitrary use of younger age
as an employment criterion would unavoidably discriminate unfairly against an
older worker whose capacity remains high ....
Id. at 37.
49. 123 CONG. REc. 34,319 (1977) (statement of Sen. Javits) (emphasis added).
Congressman Dent, Chairman of the Subcommittee, reportedly made this noteworthy
statement: "I can't see the logic of assuming that a person over 40 or 45 or 50 is physi-
cally unfit without even taking the time to make an examination or give an examination
to determine whether or not he can meet [job requirements]." See James & Alaimo,
BFOQ: An Exception Becoming the Rule, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 9 n.73 (1977).
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based on age only when there is sufficient empirical evidence
to support the assumption that an older person will be a risk
to the safety of the public.
The Eighth Circuit in EEOC v. City of St. Paul 50 held that
age was not a BFOQ for a fire chief. The court rejected the
assertion that advanced age equals incompetence. The court
found that tests, and not age alone, can accurately determine
an individual's ability to perform the tasks required of a chief.
Specifically, the court held that medical tests are a more accu-
rate predictor of health problems than age. Based on evidence
derived from such tests, the court found that public safety
would not be jeopardized by allowing a fire chief to work past
age fifty-five. 1
The facts used to prove that an age limit is a qualification
required for employment are asserted as empirical data. Ac-
tually, however, such data merely gives rise to broad general-
izations regarding the relationship of the job to the safety of
the public. For example, the First Circuit in Mahoney v.
Trabucco52 applied the Tamiami standard and found that a
mandatory retirement age was a BFOQ by stating that the
"first" element was met because "police function" is related to
the protection of person, property, law and order.5 3 This ra-
tionale avoids any empirically-based link of age with the busi-
ness necessity of public safety.
The business necessity element in cases where public safety
is the concern has similarly been supported by broad descrip-
tions of the particular qualifications needed for the particular
job of the protective service profession. 4 The broad job de-
scriptions are a basis for the assertion that physical strength
50. 671 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1982).
51. Id. at 1168.
52. 738 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1984).
53. Id. at 37. See also Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 596 F. Supp. 939, 946 (.D.N.Y.
1984) (the "reasonably necessary to the essence of the business" element addressed by
the generalization that "becoming a police officer requires good physical conditioning").
54. See, e.g., EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447, 451 (8th Cir.
1984). The court found that the state patrol's obligations to the public included: patrol-
ling of the road; handling abusive and violent motorists; engaging in high speed chases;
assisting motorists; and participating in strenuous work. The court went on to say that
"[P]hysical ability and ability to withstand stress are job qualifications which are rea-
sonably necessary to the performance of its functions and that in these terms there is a
correlation between the mandatory retirement age of sixty and the safe and efficient
performance of the Patrol's functions." Id.
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and the ability to function under stress are required and, con-
sequently, all employees must be within a particular age
grouping. The implication is that persons over a certain age
are not capable of tasks involving physical strength or high
levels of stress. Therefore, it is necessary to broadly discrimi-
nate against them on the basis of their age. There are two
problems with this argument. First, the argument is not cred-
ible when the protective service department pays minimal at-
tention to the physical condition of younger officers.
5
Second, the argument incorrectly assumes that if someone is
past a particular chronological age vital abilities are absent.1
6
The first of the problems was identified in a Seventh Cir-
cuit holding that an age fifty-five retirement requirement is not
justified as a BFOQ.57 The court indicated that the county's
failure to require annual physical examinations of any of its
employees rendered their BFOQ for age argument unpersua-
sive." Protective service employers have considered physical
fitness programs impractical to implement.5 9 This impracti-
cality may in essence be a measure of the importance truly
attached to fitness by protective service employers. If the
physical fitness of an officer over age fifty-five is so vital to the
55. See generally Nelson, Age Discrimination in Police Employment, 9 J. POLICE &
Sci. AD. 428 (1981). See also EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 768 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1985).
Overturning a district court decision upholding a mandatory retirement age, the court
noted as follows:
[T]he district court apparently assumed that good health and physical strength
are job qualifications reasonably necessary to the essence of [a police officer's]
business, but made no particularized factual finding to that effect. This omission
is particularly troubling in light of the appellant's allegations that [Pennsylvania
State Police] makes no attempt to monitor the health and physical prowess of
younger officers, and indeed permits some of them to remain on the job with
serious disabilities.
Id. at 518.
56. See generally Rowland, Age Discrimination in Retirement: In Search of an Al-
ternative, 8 J. OF L. & MED. 460 (1984).
57. Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1984).
58. Id. at 1198-99.
If [the] county requires such examination it could argue . . . that this
showed the genuiness of its concern with the physical fitness of its deputy sheriffs
and this in turn would be an argument for a mandatory retirement age, since as
we have said physical examinations are not infallible tests of continuing fitness.
But the premise is missing; the county does not require examinations.
Id.
59. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d at 454 (employer stated that it would
be impractical to force patrol members to participate in a fitness program).
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profession that retirement is mandated, it seems inconsistent
that the fitness of all officers is given such minimal attention.
Considering the inherent problems associated with the ar-
guments set forth above, a BFOQ based on a nexus between
an assumption of incompetence due to age and the necessity of
physical fitness to the business of protective service is at best
an assertion of good faith on the part of the defendant. 60 The
Seventh Circuit has noted that while public safety is a legiti-
mate municipal goal, the ADEA requires that mandatory re-
tirement policies designed to achieve that goal must be based
on something more than mere speculation or the subjective
belief that older employees are generally less capable of han-
dling the rigors of a physically demanding job.61 The courts
applying the Criswell/Tamiami test attempt to analyze cases
by an "objective" step-by-step approach: the defendant must
demonstrate with empirical evidence that an age discrimina-
tion practice is justified. The test does not contain an intent
requirement; the good faith or bad faith of the employer does
not enter into the analysis.62
B. The Second Element: Impracticality
The second element of the Criswell/Tamiami test requires
proof that age is the only practical means of assuring em-
ployee competence. This language should encourage the col-
lection of relevant empirical data as evidence. However, the
use of empirical evidence has simply resulted in competing ex-
60. EEOC v. City of Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1974) (upholding a statu-
tory retirement policy because of the "good faith" of the legislature). However, the
Seventh Circuit in Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1983),
rejected the argument that the employer's mandatory retirement policy should be up-
held as long as it was made in good faith and was "not the result of an arbitrary belief
lacking in objective reason or rationale." Id. at 752.
61. Orzel, 697 F.2d at 755.
"Under the Act, employers are to evaluate employees between the ages of 40 and 70
on their merits and not their age." Western Airlines v. Criswell, 105 S. Ct. 2743, 2756
(1985). See also EEOC v. University of Tex. Health Science Center, 710 F.2d 1091 (5th
Cir. 1983). The court stated that "offhanded, subjective opinions by hiring officials that
older applicants cannot handle the job are not by themselves sufficient to justify age
restrictions. . . . The defendant must demonstrate a specific, objective, or factual basis
for its hiring qualifications based on age." Id. at 1094. Accord EEOC v. County of
Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d 373, 373 (9th Cir. 1982) (agreeing with the necessity for a
factual foundation when asserting a BFOQ).
62. See Orzel, 697 F.2d at 755; see also, Rowland, supra note 56, at 464.
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pert testimony regarding the health and physical capabilities
of older persons. There are experts who claim no test is capa-
ble of determining the functional age of a worker. 63 There are
also experts who will predict with near certainty which indi-
viduals will be impaired by age. 64
Despite this type of conflicting testimony, expert witnesses
are an integral part of ADEA litigation. Medical science
changes and expert testimony must keep pace with such
changes. In Criswell, the Supreme Court endorsed the case-
by-case analysis necessary to assess problems involving age
discrimination in employment.6" "A rule that would require
the jury to defer to the judgment of any expert witness testify-
ing for the employer, no matter how unpersuasive, would al-
low some employers to give free rein to the stereotype of older
workers that Congress decried in the legislative history of the
ADEA. , 66
V. BFOQ's IN APPLICATION
A. A BFOQ for Initial Employment
The use of an age limit in initial protective service hiring
has been explained as necessary because of the extended peri-
ods of training and the need for the availability of career pro-
gression in order to attract candidates. 67 The contention that
investments in training are more wisely spent on younger ap-
plicants negates the entire concept of protection against age
discrimination. The purpose of the Act is to prohibit the use
of such criteria in hiring. The Act itself provides that: "It
shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire
. . . any individual or otherwise discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age."'68
63. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975) (the prediction of disabilities in bus drivers is impossible).
64. See, e.g., EEOC v. New Jersey, 620 F. Supp. 977 (D.N.J. 1985) (asserting the
accuracy of medical evidence predicting diminished aerobic capacity).
65. Criswell, 105 S. Ct. at 2755-56.
66. Id.
67. McMahon v. Barclay, 510 F. Supp. 1114 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
68. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)(1982).
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In Arritt v. Grisell,69 the Fourth Circuit reversed a maxi-
mum hiring age of thirty-five for municipal police officers on
BFOQ grounds. The trial court had relied heavily on an asser-
tion that the safety of the citizens depends on the competent
work of police officers. The Fourth Circuit did not accept this
reasoning. The court of appeals pointed out that the only
"factual support" for demonstrating that "all or substantially
all" officers over the age of thirty-five were unable to perform
their jobs was an affidavit by the chief of police. In this affida-
vit, the chief described skills believed to decline with age.7 °
In Arritt the police chief's concern about older employees
was that such employees might suffer declining physical capa-
bilities. By contrast, in an age discrimination case involving
pilots, a court decided that any physical deterioration was
more than outweighed by gains in experience and judgment.71
This rationale is equally applicable to protective service em-
ployees. It makes little sense to assume that police officers or
firefighters do not also gain through human experience.
Protective service employers asserting the BFOQ in hiring
should be able to establish empirically that "all or substan-
tially all" prospective employees over a certain age are un-
qualified for the position. However, courts have accepted bare
assertions to be the requisite empirical evidence. For example,
one court appeared to accept the bald assertion that persons
under forty-five are better able to relate to younger students.72
There was no empirical evidence presented to back up this
claim.
In cases where empirical evidence is presented, courts
must further examine the source, context and biases associ-
ated with the data. The Eighth Circuit failed to fully consider
the significance of the context and underlying assumptions of
the defendant's medical expert testimony when it held that a
maximum of age thirty-two was a BFOQ for hiring highway
patrol members and radio operators. 3 The medical expert
based his testimony on the questionable generalization that as
69. 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977).
70. Id. at 1271.
71. Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561, 564 (8th Cir. 1977).
72. EEOC v. University of Tex. Health Science Center, 710 F.2d 1091, 1096 (5th
Cir. 1983).
73. EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1984).
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one ages, one becomes sedentary. "According to [the defend-
ant's medical expert], an average 45-year-old adult male who
is sedentary does not have sufficient aerobic capacity to per-
form the duties of the Patrol. 74
Even when evidence is fully considered, not all empirical
demonstrations of the "necessity" of age criteria in hiring and
retirement warrant a BFOQ. Certain rationales offered in
support of hiring age ceilings are unlawful. For instance, in
EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol,75 the Eighth Circuit
upheld a hiring age ceiling of thirty-two apparently on eco-
nomic grounds. "The maximum entry age insured that the
Patrol can take advantage of the physical skills and abilities of
younger persons and also provide those persons with enough
experience while they are relatively young to compensate for
the inevitable reduction in their physical skills and abilities
that comes with aging."' 76 But the Act implies that differentia-
tion based on the average cost of employing older employees
as a group is generally unlawful. 77 Although it may be possi-
ble to collect valid evidence to demonstrate that persons hired
at a younger age will work longer and be better investments,
economic considerations should not be the basis for a BFOQ.
The Criswell/Tamiami test requires courts to attempt to
ascertain objectively a bona fide occupational qualification.
However, asserted as a defense in a case involving a maximum
hiring age, the "all or substantially all" analysis is strained. It
is highly unlikely that "all or substantially all" employees over
the age of thirty-five or forty would be unable to perform the
duties of a particular job. However, the BFOQ has been as-
serted to support such practices. The Ninth Circuit in EEOC
v. Los Angeles County 78 held that the refusal to consider appli-
cations of those thirty-five or over for deputy sheriff or fire
helicopter pilot was not a valid BFOQ defense. "[Although]
74. Id. at 456.
75. Id at 447. The Eighth Circuit found that although several witnesses believed
the age limit should be retained, "none of the witnesses stated that all or nearly all
persons over age 40 could not perform the duties of a police officer." Id. at 456.
76. Id. at 453.
77. See, e.g., Smallwood v. United Airlines, 661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 1007 (1982) (economic considerations cannot be the basis of a BFOQ).
For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Note, The Cost Defense Under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act, 1982 DUKE L.J. 580.
78. 706 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1983).
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strength, agility, good reflexes and ability to run appreciable
distances and lift heavy objects were reasonably necessary to
the jobs . . . no strict relationship [was shown] between age
and physical ability . . . [P]hysical performance tests can
easily distinguish those persons who possess the necessary
physical attributes and those who lack them. '79
Maximum hiring requirements, like the one successfully
challenged in the Los Angeles County case, are based on a
number of questionable assumptions concerning how younger
workers differ from older workers. In another case, for exam-
ple, in an attempt to justify a BFOQ for not hiring anyone
over forty to do police work, testimony was presented which
asserted that "older officers tend not to be 'self-starters,'
whereas younger officers are highly motivated."8
Protective service employers arguing in favor of a hiring
age ceiling have presented evidence ostensibly demonstrating
that more arrests are made by younger officers. However, this
evidence may not be a plus for youth. It does not take into
account the ability to defuse a situation without resorting to
arrest. Also, less than one percent of an officer's time on pa-
trol is spent on criminal events requiring an officer's
attention.81
Most persons over age forty are considered fit and capable
of doing protective service jobs competently. Many working
police officers and firefighters are over this age. The rationale
for a maximum hiring age as a BFOQ is questionable. At
best, it is a thinly disguised economic argument. The em-
ployer does not want to put time and money into training
someone who they plan to retire ten or fifteen years later.
79. Id. at 1043 (citations omitted).
80. Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 596 F. Supp. 939, 946 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). See also infra
n. 48.
81. See Morgan, The Use of Age by Law Enforcement Policymakers as a Predictor of
Performance, 8 J. POLICE ScI. & AD. 166 (1980) (quoting B. COHEN & J. M. CHAIKEN,
POLICE BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE 15 (1972)). "The men
who were oldest at time of appointment were least likely to advance beyond patrol
assignments, had low absenteeism for sickness, and were substantially less likely than
average to have civilian complaints .... [T]he data suggests older recruits would be
best suited for assignment to sensitive communities." Id. at 169.
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B. A BFOQ for Retirement
As opposed to its results in hiring cases, when applied to
mandatory retirement age cases, the Criswell/Tamiami stan-
dard reflects more inherent logic. It requires essentially that
the employer prove incompetence beyond a certain age or that
this incompetence cannot practically be determined through
individualized assessment techniques. The circuits are not in
agreement as to what proof is sufficient to satisfy this BFOQ
test in retirement cases. Again, often the decision turns on
expert testimony. After hearing such testimony, courts are
given the responsibility of determining the definitive diagnosis
as to the effects of age. Different holdings reflect varying
weight and credibility given by the courts to the facts
presented. 2 However, judicial selection of competing theories
on aging is not enough to support a BFOQ. Employers claim-
ing a BFOQ must present the courts with more objective, em-
pirical data on the general effects of aging.83
82. For examples of differing holdings, see Popkins v. Zagel, 611 F. Supp. 809
(C.D. Ill. 1985). The court upheld a mandatory retirement age based on "undisputed
medical testimony that substantially all persons over age 60 lack the physical capacity
to effectively work as Illinois State Troopers." Id. at 813. Contra EEOC v. Bowling
Green, 607 F. Supp. 524 (W.D. Ky. 1985). The court did not allow a mandatory retire-
ment to occur stating that based on expert testimony "[a]ll officers in the police depart-
ment could be screened periodically with physical fitness and medical tests, and those
who are determined to be high risks could be given a stress test." Id. at 526.
83. In EEOC v. County of Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1982), the Ninth
Circuit recognized that "currently available information concerning the effects of aging
is not a stagnate [sic] body of knowledge." Id. at 376. In order to prove the propriety
of a BFOQ, the court indicated that a party must provide ample evidence "as to the
general effects of aging on the performance of [specific] duties. . . [and] as to the possi-
bility of determining whether individual employees could be counted on to perform
their duties safely." Id. Mere speculation on the effect of aging would not be sufficient.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida ruled that the
Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) violated the ADEA by requiring state highway patrol
officers to retire at age 62. EEOC v. State of Florida, 40 Daily Lab Report E-1 (BNA)
(1986). This court concluded that the mandatory retirement age was not a BFOQ be-
cause the state can use other means to determine if officers are not physically able to
perform their duties. The court also determined that FHP failed to show that "all or
substantially all" persons of 62 years cannot perform a trooper's duties or that it is
"impossible or highly impractical" to test troopers on an individual basis to determine
physical fitness.
In an interesting observation, the court also stated that FHP's argument was under-
cut by the concededly adequate performance of female troopers who, because of their
size, cannot reach the "anaerobic capacity" which FHP cited as one reason that officers
over 62 must be retired. Id.
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In order to provide the necessary empirical data, employ-
ers should provide the courts with results from fitness testing
of older employees. If such testing reveals a deficiency among
older employees, a BFOQ is warranted. However, if protective
service departments do not require fitness testing of all em-
ployees, the assertion that "all or substantially all" older pro-
tective service personnel are unable to do their jobs effectively
is likely to be backed only by the speculative evidence of parti-
san experts. It is on this uncertain foundation that courts are
left to decide the age at which persons are incompetent to per-
form their jobs.
Fitness testing has been promoted by various courts in or-
der to promote objective decisions on BFOQ. "[I]n the age
bracket with which we are here concerned - 62 to 65 -
there is no suggestion that the legitimate apprehension of the
defendants cannot be met through periodic physical
examinations." 8 4
The concern for the ability of those who are entrusted with
assuring the safety of others is valid. It is a concern which is
present when the police officer, or firefighter, is hired and re-
tired. However, concern is present throughout the entire ca-
reer of a protective service employee. Fitness testing should
be employed to evaluate the competence of all protective ser-
vice employees. Only armed with empirical data gathered
from this type of institutional fitness evaluation can a protec-
tive service employer assert a valid BFOQ for mandatory
retirement.
V. CONCLUSION
A BFOQ defense based on legitimate job-related criteria is
a valid exception to the ADEA's prohibition against age dis-
crimination. The purpose of the Act is not to require employ-
ers to retain those employees who cannot perform the duties
of the job as a result of performance deficiencies related to age.
The purpose of the Act is to prohibit arbitrary age discrimina-
84. Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453, 463 (E.D. Ark. 1976). See also EEOC v.
Pennsylvania, 768 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting lack of facts supporting physical
qualifications necessary for protective service workers).
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tion in employment."5 Employees in fire and police depart-
ments are entitled to its protections.
The ban against arbitrary age discrimination was included
because ADEA drafters believed mandatory hiring and retire-
ment policies are frequently based on misconceptions, not
facts. If a mandatory age requirement is based on facts, it is
not arbitrary discrimination. It is a bona fide occupational
qualification. 6Age discrimination is similarly not arbitrary if
it is based on the requirements necessary for a particular posi-
tion rather than an entire class.8 7 The requirement of a rela-
tionship to public safety demands a BFOQ analysis focused on
the individual job in question. It is unlikely that the goal of
public safety requires the same level of fitness for a radio dis-
patcher as it does for a member of a SWAT team.
Mandatory age restrictions in protective service hiring and
retirement must be interpreted in accordance with the purpose
of the BFOQ. An initial employment policy related to age
and unsupported by an objective rationale is arbitrary age dis-
crimination and not a BFOQ. There has been no valid empiri-
cal data supporting the assertion that a police officer hired at
forty is less able to perform the duties of the job than the forty
year old officer already working.88
Unlike its assertion in a hiring context, the use of a BFOQ
in a mandatory retirement context does not necessarily equal
arbitrary discrimination. It is possible to establish a bona fide
age criterion for jobs within a protective service occupation.
However, such a criterion must be supported by facts. The
factual basis can be accomplished by proof derived from fit-
ness testing for assessment of required job-related abilities. If
the goal of a BFOQ in the protective service job is public
safety, the mandatory retirement policy must be objectively
linked with this goal.
85. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982).
86. See S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 507.
87. See supra notes 10-35 and accompanying text.
88. The lack of a factual basis to exclude a qualified older applicant will be an asset
for employers of protective service workers in the future. A decline in the availability of
a younger labor force is projected. The pool of qualified applicants for jobs will be
expanded by the removal of an age barrier. See generally Morrison, The Aging of the
U.S. Population: Human Resource Implications, 106 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 13 (1983).
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The inclusion of the BFOQ in the ADEA allows protec-
tive service employers to consider the goal of public safety. It
requires employers to achieve this goal in an individualized
and careful manner. The assurance of public safety logically
implies that those in positions of direct law enforcement have
a level of physical fitness that does not compromise public
safety. This can be assured only through testing of job-related
skills8 9
Experts agree that as an individual's age increases the indi-
vidual's capability to perform physical activities decreases.
The experts also agree that the decline varies by individual
and that exercise and physical training can slow this decline in
physical abilities. These points of agreement form the basis
for a fair retirement policy and valid BFOQ defense. The
medical profession and the courts have recognized that it is
feasible to identify the skills needed for each protective service
position and to assess these skills.90 Testing can identify an
age which is associated with a deterioration of skills. The
same tests can be used by the individual who has reached the
retirement age but desires to prove continued fitness for the
job. This type of policy was upheld in Adams v. James9 in
which a police department had a mandatory retirement age of
sixty. This retirement age requirement, however, was coupled
with the policy that any officer over that age could continue
employment on a year-to-year basis as long as the officer re-
mained physically fit to carry out his duties.
A retirement policy based on an empirical fitness assess-
ment has advantages to the public, the employer, and the em-
ployee. It promotes public safety by encouraging fitness
throughout the career of a police officer or of a fire fighter. It
89. The physical abilities needed to perform law enforcement duties are easily
tested. [There are] many simple and inexpensive tests which can easily assess a
patrolman's balance, flexibility, agility, speed, power and endurance. If the Pa-
trol is genuinely concerned about the well-being of the public and its officers, it
can readily evaluate its members and discharge those who cannot perform up to
standard.
EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 596 F. Supp. 1333, 1341 (D. Pa. 1984).
90. See generally Rowland, Age Discrimination in Retirement: In Search of an Al-
ternative, 8 J. L. & MED. 433 (1984). Comprehensive tests of job performances are
available and include an analysis of functions necessary for a particular job and medical
tests to determine whether a person would be fit for those functions. Id. at 449.
91. 526 F. Supp. 80 (M.D. Ala. 1981).
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provides data to support a retirement age as a bona fide occu-
pational qualification, and it allows the qualified individual
the opportunity of continued employment. This is not arbi-
trary age discrimination and is in accord with the intent of the
ADEA: "A person with the ability and desire to work should
not be denied that opportunity solely because of age. "92
KAYE K. VANCE
92. S. REP. No. 256, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 506.
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